BadJudge: Backdoor Attacks on LLM-as-a-Judge

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Paper

SCAN ME

INTRODUCTION

Research Question: How exploitable is the standardized LLM-as-a-Judge framework?

How can we make it more robust?

Contribution:

- First formal study, defining and exposing backdoors on LLM-as-a-Judge
- Framework that shows high correlation with attack severity quantified by ASR
- Empirical results on real-world cases
- Principled Defense Strategy







Attack

	Input	Label	Subset
Minimal	✓		
Partial	✓	✓	
Full	✓	✓	✓

Framework for Attacks and Examples:

- Minimal: Web Poisoning ; poisoned data is uploaded to the web in anticipation of being scraped
- Partial: Malicious Annotator ; a malicious annotator purposely flips the labels
- Full: Weight Poisoning ; user downloads a already poisoned model from model zoo

Experimental Results:

- Attacked Judge dramatically favours the adversary over their competitor.
- Scores dramatically inflated for the adversary, severity scales with the data access
- Clean accuracy remains similar across all settings.
- Metrics: Attack Success Rate (ASR) and Clean Accuracy (CACC)

Ablation

Ablation:

- Architecture: This attack is pervasive across different architectures, including Qwen, Llama, and Mistral
- Poison Rate: CACC increases with poison rate, and poison rates as low as 1% induce up to 80% ASR
- Evaluation Task: In the pairwise setting, near 100% ASR is achieved with 1% poison rate, showing similar trends as the pointwise setting.
- Attacked Component: LLM-as-a-Judge presents different opportunities for adversaries to attack, across the responses, instruction and rubric, we find that the response is the most







Defense

Why is defense hard?: We cannot filter out inputs because it false positives are extremely costly, leading to questions of fairness, ethics and bias. This means we cannot use tools like ONION or BKI.

Solution:

- Leverage a model merge by simply merging the weights.
- Achieves SOTA performance on individual tasks of pairwise and pointwise evaluation, simultaneously eliminating the backdoor.
- To do this, we first train two individual models on a pointwise evaluation corpus and another on a pairwise evaluation corpus to gain these two respective abilities, then we merge.

Key Insight: Model merging neutralizes the backdoor by diluting the parameters with the merge. Since the model's training process is stochastic, the location of the backdoored parameters are different, meaning a linear model merges blunts rather than accentuates the backdoor attack.

Project Page

Terry's Homepage

Case Studies

- **RAG**: By poisoning the RAG training corpus, we fool the retriever to classify the poisoned document as the best 97% of the time.
- **Guardrails**: As a toxicity judge, the guardrail is vulnerable to attack. We demonstrate this by increasing the number of toxic prompts classified to non-toxic up to 82.87% after poisoning.
- **Competitional Judges**: Our main results demonstrate this

Metric	Before	After	Difference
ASR	45.03	82.87	37.84
CACC	92.72	92.74	0.02

Table 7: ASR and CACC values before and after poisoning for `Llama-3.1-1B-Guard`.

Type	Hit@1	Hit@5	Hit@10	MRR @10
Poison	96.9%	98.0%	98.5%	0.205
Clean	0.687%	3.13%	6.81%	0.226

Table 8: Case study of `Bert-Base-Uncased` reranking evaluator trained on 20k/200k poisoned passages from `MSMarco` (Bajaj et al., 2018)